![]() ![]() One of the most widely adopted definitions of corruption includes rational choice assumptions and a principal-agent perspective: the abuse of entrusted (or in some definitions, public) authority for personal, private gain (Kolstad and Søreide 2009 Svensson 2005). This scenario is a particular problem since, if we assume that individuals are rational actors, opportunities for profitable rent-seeking (self-benefiting) behaviours are unlikely to be passed up (Marquette and Pfeiffer 2015 Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013 Sappington 1991 Klitgaard 1998 Rose-Ackerman 1978). Agents are more likely to act in ways that maximise their own interests rather than those of the principal, particularly when information asymmetries exist and the principal cannot fully monitor the agent’s behaviour. ![]() bureaucrats) to act on their behalf, for instance to produce public goods like environmental protection or security. This is a function of organising cooperative behaviour, which often requires delegation of responsibility for tasks both to and within formal institutions and organisations. Köbis et al (2016) label this as the “social dilemma”.Second, corruption may (also) be a principal-agent problem. First, corruption may be a particular type of collective action problem,a prisoner’s dilemma, wherein individuals have incentives to pursue their own self-interest, rather than work with others towards the collective good. We can divide rational choice explanations for corruption into three sub-fields: collective action (prisoner’s dilemma) approaches principal agent approaches and coordination game approaches. The ultimate goal for individuals is to maximise utility: to attain whatever goal makes them happier, more satisfied, or better off, such as power or money. Moreover, individuals have fixed, well-defined, ranked, and consistent preferences, and they behave instrumentally to achieve those preferences. People are calculating and strategic, and they carefully weigh the costs and benefits of certain actions before undertaking them. Rooted in methodological individualism, 9ce460a3c47e rational choice theory models human behaviour as the result of individual, self-interested preferences (Hall and Taylor 1996 Elster 1989). Rational choice approaches: Prisoners dilemma, principal-agent, and coordination approaches ![]() For instance, it is very hard to know ex-ante when corruption will or will not be functional or useful, why some people act corruptly while others do not if corruption is functional, and which types of problems are more amenable to (functional) corrupt solutions. However, as outlined in Table 1 at the conclusion of this section, functionalist explanations for corruption are generally unsatisfying and raise more questions than they answer since they often result in tautological arguments. Marquette and Pfeiffer (2015) extend this logic to non-investors in a neo-functionalist argument, arguing that corruption can be viewed as a form of “problem-solving”, a useful way of dealing with problems that people face. Dreher and Gassebner 2013 Méon and Sekkat 2005 Méon 2010). A fairly large but inconclusive body of literature has emerged within the field of economics on the greasing versus sanding the wheels debate, with authors finding evidence that both supports and challenges the greasing the wheels theory (c.f. In this view, corruption is a way of quickly cutting through burdensome regulatory requirements, distributing resources, and generating economic growth (ibid). In political science, functionalist explanations of corruption appeared in the work of scholars such as Samuel Huntington (1968), who viewed corruption as a way to “grease the wheels” to get things done, especially for investors and companies (Marquette and Pfeiffer 2015 Manzetti and Wilson 2007). (We developed this background information in connection to U4 Issue The cognitive psychology of corruption)įunctional psychology and behavioural functionalism emerged within psychology in the first half of the 20th century, to explain patterns in human behaviour as the result of response to external stimuli and adaptation to one’s environment (c.f. Both approaches face a number of challenges in explaining corrupt behaviour. To date, functionalist and rational choice explanations have been the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of corruption.
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